Icelandic Family Policy by Kvaran, Sigrún Dögg
 
 
Lund University 
Department of Sociology 
 
 
 
 
Icelandic Family Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author: Sigrún Kvaran 
WPMM42, Master thesis 
30 credits 
Spring semester, 2015 
Supervisor: Åsa Lundqvist 
  
 
 
Abstract 
Author: Sigrún Kvaran 
Title: Icelandic Family Policy 
Master Thesis WPMM42 
30 credits 
Supervisor: Åsa Lundqvist 
Department of Sociology, spring semester 2015 
 
Inequality and the risk of poverty in Icelandic society have been in the debate since the 
economic crisis in 2008. The family policy is criticised by academics for a lack of economic 
support for individuals with dependent children both in the form of child benefits and low 
payments during parental leave. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how economic 
support for families of cohabitating parents and single parents with average and minimum 
incomes is distributed. The data used for the analysis is mainly gathered from Statistics 
Iceland, a public institution, and the Ministry of Welfare. As a guideline to the analysis a 
theoretical framework was created that makes use of the concept of family policy, inequality 
and poverty and transformations in the welfare regimes.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the family policy helps in reducing the risk of poverty 
among families with dependent children. However, the income tested child benefits are highly 
income sensitive with strict curtailment limit. Regarding the payments during parental leave 
there are indications they are too low. Low maximum payments during parental leave are 
linked to reduced birth rates and a decrease in the number of fathers using their rights to take 
time off from work to spend with their newborns. There is a severe difference in economic 
support of single parents and cohabitating parents in form of benefits and subsidies. Single 
parents with dependent children receive more economic support nevertheless it does not seem 
to be enough. Single parents need more economic support to prevent them from falling below 
the threshold of being at risk of poverty. Furthermore sustaining an acceptable living standard 
in Iceland for a single parent with dependent children seems to be a distant goal. 
Keywords: Family policy, child benefits, parental leave, single parent, welfare system, at risk 
of poverty, inequality, living standard 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General introduction 
"While social policy research has been both improving and increasing, the 
welfare of many has got worse with widening inequality and increasing and 
deepening poverty in many countries."  
 
(Andersen, Guillemard, Jensen & Pfau-Effinger, 2005, p. 26) 
 
The general understanding of a welfare state is that the state takes care of its citizens by 
protecting them and providing them with insurance when they are in need of it (Jordan, 2006). 
Iceland is one of the Nordic countries, which are all well-known welfare states, and as such 
they are associated with the idea of high gender equality, high labour force participation 
among women and overall known as family friendly societies.  
 
In the case of Iceland, one of the debates after the economic crisis in 2008 has been about the 
lack of economic support from the welfare system for families with dependent children. The 
economic consequences for households were considerable as they were dealing with a sharp 
increase in inflation, while at the same time the government had to increase levies. This is 
something that has been in the debate the past six years. There are signs of a growing 
proportion of households with dependent children having problems sustaining a living 
standard in accordance with a welfare society (The Welfare Watch, 2013). To be able to get a 
clear picture of this problem, a specific consumer standard is needed as a measurement tool 
for household’s economies. In 2011 the Ministry of Welfare published a report on such a 
consumer standard. The project was built on extensive data collection from the Statistical 
Bureau of Iceland (e. Statistics Iceland) using real consumption of Icelandic households 
(Sturluson, Eydal, & Ólafsson, 2011). This consumer standard has two guidelines; basic and 
typical. The basic consumer standard represents the minimum cost of living and the typical 
one represents the average consumption (ibid). However, unexpectedly, this publication came 
as a shock to the public as it revealed too many households would never be able to afford this 
standard of living. Scholars and organisations came forth with articles and reports on the 
discrepancy of the consumption standard from the Ministry of Welfare. Njáls (2011) is one of 
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these scholars, arguing that individuals who receive unemployment benefits and social 
benefits are far from being able to live by this consumption standard. The Organization of 
Disabled in Iceland also criticised this new consumption standard by pointing out the 
disability benefits are far from sufficient, moreover the health care cost seems to be greatly 
underestimated (Þorgeirsdóttir, 2011).  
 
Accordingly, there is a growing debate about the economic situation among Icelandic families 
with dependent children. Scholars and organizations argue for increased difficulty among 
households in providing acceptable living standard and that they are in need of more 
economic support from the welfare state (Ólafsson, Kristjánsson & Stefánsson, 2012). This 
has resulted in a debate about child benefits, and particularly how parents with average 
incomes have access to almost no child benefits. Thus, the welfare system does not appear to 
be a universal one, as it only provides economic support to those who have a high need for it, 
or individuals with lower incomes. 
 
A similar debate regarding the parental leave also exists, as some suggest that it can be too 
much of an economic burden than it was years ago. Also, the maximum payments appear too 
low compared to the cost of living (Arnarsson, 2014). The Minister of Social Affairs stresses 
the bad outlook due to decreasing birth rates and a decrease in the number of fathers using 
their rights to parental leave (The Ministry of Welfare, 2014). The total fertility rate (TFR) in 
Iceland has also declined slightly. Before the crisis in 2008 the TFR was 2,14 and in 2013 it 
had decreased to 1,93 (Statistics Iceland, 2014a). The development in the number of mothers 
and fathers using their rights to parental leave is shown below in figure 1. The data from the 
Icelandic parental leave benefit fund (Fæðingarorlofssjóður) for the years 2012-2014 is a 
preliminary and thus should be interpreted provisionally. However, a considerable decrease in 
the proportion of fathers using their rights to parental leave can be seen. In 2007 there were 
3,729 fathers that took parental leave and for 2014 that number has decreased to 2,771 fathers. 
Additionally as can be seen below in figure 1, from 2009 until mid 2013 the number of 
mothers also taking parental leave decreased.  
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Figure 1 Number of mothers and fathers that take parental leave 2007-2014 
 
Reference: Adapted from Fæðingarorlofssjóður (2015a).  
 
Meanwhile, a more worrisome problem is developing in Iceland. After the economic crisis in 
2008, there has been a sharp increase in child poverty (UNICEF, 2014). As a result, the idea 
that Icelandic family policy needs to be reformed to meet the growing requirements for 
economic support among parents has grown in popularity. It is thought that increasing child 
benefits and the maximum payments during parental leave would be effective in reducing the 
proportion of households that are at risk of poverty.  
 
1.2 Aim and research question 
This study aims to analyse the economic support of the Icelandic family policy both in form 
of benefits and entitlements, attempting to investigate how it is delivered along the 
households’ income distribution. Additionally, the analysis seeks to understand the increasing 
poverty rates in Iceland. Hence, the general aim is to understand how family policy affects 
inequality and poverty.  
The following research questions will be addressed: 
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How is the economic support of the Icelandic family policy outlined in terms of benefits and 
entitlements? Does it help in reducing the risk of inequality and/or poverty? 
 
1.3 Previous research and background 
In this part the development of the Icelandic welfare system and information on the labour 
market will be provided. Moreover in the end of this chapter the Welfare Watch will be 
introduced. The welfare system and the labour market are in fact related fields. Hantrais 
(2004) argues that due to increased proportion of women participating on the labour market it 
brings out measures of the welfare state. Both parents participating on the labour market has 
shifted the main responsibility from the mothers as the sole caretakers of their children over to 
the welfare state (ibid). Hence, family policy has an important role in assisting parents in 
combining work and parenthood together.  
 
1.3.1 The Icelandic welfare system 
In some aspects, the Icelandic welfare system differs from the other Nordic countries such as 
in the structure of the social security system and in the amount of benefits (Eydal & Ólafsson, 
2006). Eydal and Ólafsson (2006) argue that this pattern is also reflected in the family policy. 
The development of the Icelandic family policy has been an ongoing process ever since the 
first law in 1946. For a long time people did not understand the concept of family policy 
(ibid). It was not until 1994 with increased research on families that the understanding of its 
importance was improved and how it increases equity within the society (Eydal & Ólafsson; 
2003, 2006). This increased awareness and research on family policy resulted in the Icelandic 
Parliament finally formulating an official family policy in the year 1997 (Althingi, 1997). 
There are three main purposes; to insure equality between men and women, to emphasise the 
emotional engagements of the family and finally to secure all children and their opportunities 
(Althingi, 1997).  
There are many previous research studies on the Icelandic welfare system and how it has 
developed through time both in forms of benefits and in the construction of it. In one such 
research by Eydal and Ólafsson (2003) it is stressed that in the 1960s and 1970s Iceland did 
not keep up with the other Nordic countries in welfare growth. They continue to argue that in 
the 1990s Iceland spent considerably low proportion of the Gross Net Production (GNP) on 
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the welfare system, around 18-19 percent (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2003). Furthermore, they argue 
that the main difference between Iceland and the other Nordic countries is in their services to 
families with dependent children and the benefit system (ibid). They conclude that when it 
comes to families with dependent children, Iceland spends on average half as much in benefits 
and support compared to Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2003; 
Eydal & Ólafsson, 2006). Furthermore they argue that the Icelandic child benefits are income-
tested, the spending is 55-78 percent less on that factor compared to the other Nordic 
countries.  
This is supported by Ólafsson (2012) in a similar study on the expenditure on Icelandic family 
policy. He argues that in percentage the expenditures have increased by 100 percent between 
the years 1997 and until 2008. However, despite this increase he stresses that Iceland still 
spends less on this category than the other Nordic countries (ibid). Additionally Eydal and 
Ólafsson (2012) argue the main reason for this increase in Icelandic expenditures was related 
to changes in the parental leave system in 2000. They continue to argue that the expenditures 
in child benefits were severely decreased resulting in tightened living conditions among 
families with dependent children (ibid). Also Eydal and Ólafsson (2012) stress that the 
Icelandic social security system differs from the other Nordic countries as it has generally 
based its benefit payments on a flat rate and/or it is income-tested. Additionally Ólafsson 
(1999) argues that Iceland has never adopted the Scandinavian tradition of income 
replacement in its social security system. 
Until the economic crisis in 2008 the income taxes were low, resulting in individuals being 
the main supporters of the welfare system rather than the state treasury (Njáls, 2003). 
Additionally, during this time of economic prosperity the responsibility of the state in 
supporting those in need of the welfare system was transferred to the municipals. Furthermore 
the municipals then transferred their responsibilities to aid agencies, such as the church (ibid). 
As a result, the Icelandic welfare system is sometimes referred to as being more in line with 
liberalism than social democracy, at least before the economic crisis in 2008 (Njáls, 2003). 
However, not all agree that this refers to the whole welfare system. Evans (2011) argues that 
there is an exception of this liberal transformation in the Icelandic welfare system, specifically 
in the case of the family policy. She argues that due to high proportion of women on the 
labour market the need for secure access to public day care was necessary. The development 
in access to day care service between the years 1995 until 2007 expanded into being a 
universal scheme for all children from the age of three (Evans, 2011). Furthermore, she 
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suggests that in easing the part of income tested child benefits down from 50,8 percent to 25,7 
percent, this is also not in accordance to liberalism. Moreover, she argues that the family 
policy has kept its social-democratic character before and after the economic crisis in 2008 
(ibid). 
In Iceland the child benefits are income-tested and calculated in a way that benefits single 
parents more. Hence, single parents usually receive higher benefits than cohabitating couples. 
This is in line with Eydal and Ólafsson (2003) arguing that single parents in Iceland receive 
almost double in child benefits compared to cohabitating couples. Njáls (2003) argues that in 
the case of Iceland the development of the welfare system is more towards being conditional 
welfare which is more related to libertarianism than social democracy. She goes on by 
explaining how the low income threshold of social benefits and harsh curtailment limits, even 
in the case of child benefits, can often be related to an increased risk of poverty. This is in line 
with Kruse and Ståhlberg (2013) arguing that child benefits are a tool used to increase 
equality. They continue to argue the fact that single earning homes are struggling more 
economically than dual earning households. However, child benefits are a solution for 
children from all social ladders no matter how good or bad their household economy is. Child 
benefits can be used to assist all children in having equal opportunities (Kruse & Ståhlberg, 
2013). The International Social Security Association (ISSA) argues that societies adopting a 
strong family policy have a good safety net. This safety net helps individuals with dependent 
children to by combine work with family life (ISSA, 2015). 
 
1.3.2 The Icelandic labour market 
Employment participation in Iceland is high, with 80,9 percent of working individuals 
between the age of 17-74 and an unemployment rate in 2014 of 4,7 percent (Statistics Iceland, 
2015a). Additionally, of all the Nordic countries the highest proportion of employed women is 
in Iceland. In 2012 the proportion of employed women was 78,5 percent (OECD, 2013). 
Because income affects benefits and parental leave payments, a clearer picture is needed on 
the average and minimum wages. The concept of regular wages refers to wages for contracted 
working hours per month and as such it does not matter if it is work during daytime or 
evenings (Statistical Series, 2015). The latest data on the average income of individuals for 
fully employed wage earner is for the calendar year of 2014, with an average wage of 454,000 
ISK, equal to 3,100 Euros. Additionally, to be able to calculate the amount of entitled child 
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benefits later in the analysis part, the average income is needed for the year 2013. The reason 
for needing this income information for the year 2013 is due to the child benefits being paid 
on income for the previous year. In 2013 the average income was 436.000 ISK or equal to 
2,975 Euros (Statistics Iceland, 2015b).  
Many countries have enacted laws on minimum wages to counteract poverty and protect the 
wage earners. However Iceland has not enacted such a law despite many discussions in the 
parliament (Althingi, 2014). Therefore, the labour unions negotiate the agreements for the 
legal minimum wages of a full time job and in 2014 it was 214,000 ISK per month or 1,434 
Euros (VR, 2015). Again, as additional information for calculating the child benefits, the 
minimum wage in 2013 was 204,000 ISK or equal to 1,392 Euros (ibid).  
As for the income taxes in Iceland they are relatively high and are calculated by three 
different income thresholds as can be seen below in table 1. For the analysis in this study, the 
two tax percentages used are for minimum wages which is 37,30 percent and for average 
wages which is 39,74 percent. However, there is a personal tax deduction of 50,902 ISK per 
month or equal to 350 Euros (RSK, 2015a). 
 
Table 1 Tax percentages per monthly salary for all Icelandic income 
Tax liability for the income year 2014 
ISK Euros Tax % 
   0 - 309,140 0 - 2,125 37,30 
309,141 - 836,404 2,126 - 5,752 39,74 
Income exceeding 836,404 Income exceeding 5,753 46,24 
 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015a). 
 
The majority of individuals on the labour market are working full time. In 2014 74,2 percent 
had a full time job and 25,8 percent had a part time job (Statistics Iceland, 2015c). However, 
individuals with a part time job decreased slightly between years. Additionally there is a 
gender difference and more women than men are working in a part time job, or 36,2 percent 
compared to 16,3 percent (ibid). The changes over time in part time job participation among 
men and women can be seen below in figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Individuals working part time jobs 2000 – 2014 
 
Reference: Adapted from Statistics Iceland (2015c). 
 
As can be seen above in figure 2, the proportion of individuals in a part time job peaked in 
2001 with a 26,3 percent and in 2008 it had decreased to 21,2 percent. Furthermore, as can be 
seen, the percentage of individuals in part time jobs increased sharply after the crisis in 2008. 
The reason for this sharp increase in part time jobs after the economic crisis in 2008, was due 
to difficulties in finding full time jobs (Lanninger & Sundström, 2014). 
 
1.3.3 The Welfare Watch 
“It is often said, not least by middle-income groups themselves, that the position 
of the middle class has been eroding over the last two decades in comparison to 
other groups.”  
(Mahler, Jesuit & Paradowski, 2013, p. 149) 
In March 2009 the government established the Welfare Watch, a commission of specialists 
with the aim of researching the social and economic influence of the economic crisis in 2008 
(The Ministry of Welfare, 2015). This is an independent group composed of organisations, 
members from the labour market, ministries, institutions and municipals (ibid). The Welfare 
Watch has for the past five years conducted many studies on the situation among households 
and families in the society. Furthermore, the aim of the Welfare Watch is to evaluate the 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
2
0
1
3
 
2
0
1
4
 
%
 
Year 
Employed part time 
9 
 
government’s actions and to see if it is necessary to come up with ameliorations (The Welfare 
Watch, 2013). They state that over the past eight years repeated survey measurements 
conducted in Iceland have shown that almost ten percent of individuals have income below 
the minimum level and are therefore defined as being at risk of poverty (The Welfare Watch, 
2012). Additionally, they estimate that in 2012, 8,800 children or around 10 percent in the age 
of 0-17 live below the minimum income level. In their final report published in December 
2013, it is stressed that poverty in Icelandic society is real, there are children defined as poor. 
There have been some fluctuations in the proportion of children at risk of poverty. In 2005 it 
was 10,1 percent and a year after the crisis in 2009 it had decreased to 9,9 percent, however in 
2013 it had increased again up to 12,2 percent (Statistical Series, 2014; Statistics Iceland, 
2013). Another worrisome development highlighted by the Welfare Watch is the participation 
of both parents in taking parental leave. One of the impacts of the economic crisis has been a 
decrease in the ability of both parents to use their rights to parental leave. The Welfare Watch 
links this development to the severe decrease in entitlement to payment (The Welfare Watch, 
2013). In their report, it is argued that since the beginning of their research there are strong 
signs of a lack of both coordination and cooperation in the institutions that work in the field of 
welfare services (ibid).  
Finally it is important to state that researches show that the risk of relative poverty in Iceland 
is one of the lowest among European countries and North-America (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2012). 
Also research on poverty establish that there are certain groups of families with dependent 
children that are in an insecure situation and that some of these may have been affected 
negatively (Ólafsson 1999; Njáls 2003). Findings show that those who are at most risk are 
single mothers and families with three or more dependent children (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2012).  
 
1.3.4 Summary 
With the high labour market participation among Icelandic women it is important for the 
welfare system to respond to this demand as a safety net. Parents need to be able to count on 
the welfare system to share the responsibilities for their children, in order to be able to work a 
full time job. Additionally one of the purposes of the Icelandic family policy is to ensure 
equality between men and women. Hence, they should be equally able to fully participate on 
the labour market and both should be able to use their right to parental leave. Therefore, it is 
important that the welfare system assists families with appropriate measures. However, the 
10 
 
Welfare Watch (2013) stresses the development in both parents using their rights to parental 
leave and stresses their concern about the development in child poverty rates. 
  
1.4  Scope and contribution 
The aim of this study is to analyse if some family forms are more vulnerable than others due 
to low income or even, if families with average income are in need of more economic support. 
This study will be measuring the economic support of the Icelandic family policy for 
households with both average and minimum wages. The reason for this is to examine the 
Icelandic family policy with the growing problem of child poverty in mind. By doing this 
research of the household’s income, cost of living and how the distribution of economic 
support is, it should reveal how important this support is for households with dependent 
children. Therefore, this study will help to provide information on families with dependent 
children and the proportion of economic support they are entitled to. It can also raise 
awareness of the problems Icelandic families face in making ends meet. It can also help to 
inform and affect the debate that hopefully can lead to increased support for these households. 
 
1.5  Outline 
This study is constructed into seven parts. The first part has provided the reader with an 
introduction of the research question and practical information on background and previous 
research on Icelandic family policy. The second part will introduce the theoretical framework. 
Then the third part will explain definitions used in this research, the fourth chapter will be on 
the methodological aspect of the study and here the methods, data and limitations will be 
discussed. The fifth part is detailed information on the main factors within the Icelandic 
family policy; here the child benefits and parental leave will be thoroughly explained among 
all other important factors. Then the sixth part is the analytical part and then finally is the 
seventh part of conclusion and discussion.  
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2  Theoretical framework 
2.1 Family policy  
Iceland is known for high gender equality and as the other Nordic countries it is known as a 
dual earner society. Referring to the high female labour participation explained in the 
background chapter Hantrais (2004) argues that the reason for the Nordic countries being 
known as family friendly societies is their approach to family policies and how it is delivered. 
Furthermore, she suggests that the high standard of benefits and service provides individuals 
with increased flexibility and more personal choice in services. Additionally, Hantrais (2004) 
stresses that family policies can help in preventing families from falling into poverty and that 
this applies particularly to the Nordic countries as they have relatively high benefits. She goes 
on to argue that the family policy helps in reducing income inequalities and thus raising the 
standard of living (ibid). However, some welfare states have enacted means-tested benefits 
and such arrangements are known to aim at specific family types and therefore do not 
improve qualities for all families. Hantrais (2004) also writes about if family policy with 
means-tested benefits can be described as family policy at all. 
Leira (2006) argues about how this type of society sponsors the service and benefits for 
families, motivating women to participate on the labour market. Furthermore, Leira points out 
that in the Nordic countries, fathers are not seen as the main household providers, rather as the 
companion parent to the working mothers. The dual earner model with public policies for 
childcare is intended for both parents to be able to participate in the labour market and still 
find balance between work-life and parenthood. In the Nordic countries emphasis has been on 
combining the work-balance with family life, moving more from the classic male 
breadwinning role to women fully participating on the labour market and also having a 
family, hence the importance of affordable day-care service for children (Hantrais, 2004).  
As for the typical family form, it is changing with an increased number of single parents. 
Skevik (2006) stresses how lone mothers are no longer a small group and in the Nordic 
countries the divorce rates are relatively high creating new challenges for policy makers. 
Providing for dependent children in single income households in a dual earner society 
increases the need for benefit policies and high coverage of public day care service for this 
vulnerable group (Skevik, 2006). These changing family forms are also mentioned by 
Hantrais (2004), stressing that public policies can affect living arrangements such as in the 
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Nordic countries where legal reforms have extended rights to unmarried cohabitating couples, 
same sex couples and children being borne out of wedlock. Most countries have schemes to 
support families who are struggling to provide for themselves and also these countries have 
measures for single parents, as a public safety net for families (Hantrais, 2004).  
 
2.2 Transformation in welfare regimes 
It was in 1990 that Esping-Andersen saw a pattern in the structure of the welfare states and 
how they differed from each other. He determined that the welfare states could be clustered 
into three different regimes; Social Democratic, Conservative and Liberal (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). He argued that the purest welfare regime was the social-democratic regime, with 
strong universalism and high equality within the society. In this typology of Esping-Andersen 
this regime is built on the desire of social unity with policies emphasising universalism across 
class lines (Scruggs & Allan, 2008).  
However, it is important to remember that not all countries are identified as social democratic 
welfare societies and there are different types of welfare societies, as Esping-Andersen 
argued. He stressed the different emphasis among these three regimes on the category of 
social policy. Furthermore, there are social-policy researchers which argue that welfare states 
within Europe are developing more into a neo-liberal type of welfare regimes and that this 
development may increase the risk of poverty and social exclusion (Andersen et al, 2005). 
Additionally, it is important for this study to know the structure of the neo-liberal model, 
especially as there are scholars arguing that Iceland sometimes seems to take after that model 
(Eydal & Ólafsson, 2006; Ólafsson, 2011; Njáls, 2003). One of the main differences between 
neo-liberal policy and social democratic policy is that in liberalism the emphasis is more on 
the individual taking responsibility for their own actions and on work as a more reliable way 
out of poverty rather than relying on benefits (Jordan, 2006). Furthermore the neo-liberal 
model supports tax credits as a method to supplement the earnings of low income households 
and the reason for this was to increase an individual’s willingness to take a low paying job 
(ibid).   
Countries choosing to spend low proportion on the welfare system and with strict curtailment 
limits are often discussed as being influenced by liberalism or laissez-faire policies (Njáls, 
2003). The period throughout the mid - 1990s and until the early 2000s is often referred to as 
the time when Iceland went through a liberal transformation of the welfare system (Evans, 
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2011). It developed more towards privatisation with the aim to increase its competitiveness 
(Evans, 2011). Ólafsson (2011) argues that this development of the Icelandic welfare system 
at this time was achieved at the expense of the social-democratic character of the welfare 
system. 
 
2.3 Inequality and poverty  
“When inequalities are widening in many countries, the changing patterns of 
social security become all the more important.”  
(Andersen et al, 2005, p. 24) 
The recognition for the need of social protection started during the period of welfare states 
with the goal of social policy used to reduce inequality and create opportunities for 
individuals to thrive and progress (Jordan, 2006). The aim of the welfare policy was to reduce 
an obvious class difference between wealthy individuals and the average wage worker (ibid). 
However, nowadays poverty is a growing problem even in wealthy countries, which is a 
serious development.  
Salonen (2014) argues a strong family policy makes a significant difference in lowering the 
risk of poverty among children. In his research on Sweden, his findings show that without a 
strong family policy the poverty of Swedish children would be as much as three times higher. 
Therefore, he notes how important social policy is as a tool to fight against inequality and 
poverty. These findings of Salonen are in line with the many scholars arguing that welfare 
societies that use social policies to focus on individuals in need, have the most resourceful 
tool to reduce inequality and poverty (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Pierson, 2007). For example, the 
state can focus on the welfare needs of an individual through things such as income support in 
the form of childcare benefits or through providing secure housing, amongst others. (Pierson, 
2007).  
In general, scholars agree that there has not been enough research conducted on poverty, 
particularly in Iceland. Generally to be able to discuss poverty in Iceland, it is important to 
define the income groups. Ólafsson and Kristjánsson (2013) have defined income groups in 
their study and in their classification, the middle class in Iceland has disposable income 
between 75 and 125 percentage of the median income. Additionally, those who are below the 
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relative poverty line have less than 50 percent of the median income. In their research on 
inequality in Iceland, it is revealed that the proportion of the population falling below the 
relative poverty line increased from seven percent in 1997 to nine percent in 2001 and onward 
(ibid). Furthermore, they argue that at the same time as the relative poverty population grows 
in Iceland the middle class is decreasing. In 1992, 43 percent of the Icelandic population was 
defined to be in the middle class and in 2009 that group had decreased down to 39 percent 
(ibid). They argue that the group of very high income earners is increasing and that this is a 
clear sign of a declining middle class and an increasing difference between the bottom and top 
income groups (ibid). Additionally Ólafsson and Kristjánsson (2013) argue that the tax burden 
of the middle- and the lower classes was increased between the years 1995-2006, resulting in 
increased inequality for those groups. 
The scholars Bernburg and Ólafsdóttir (2012) discuss attitudes towards income inequality. 
They stress that there are no real measurements of the attitudes and norm of Icelandic 
individuals towards income inequality. However, there is a simple longitudinal attitude survey 
on individual’s perspective towards income inequality conducted over the years by the Social 
Science Research Institute (Bernburg & Ólafsdóttir, 2012). What these surveys have in 
common is that ever since the first one was conducted in 1983, the majority of the participants 
or 90 percent find the income difference to be too high. Secondly there is almost no difference 
in this opinion between years or ever since the first one was conducted in 1983 (ibid). 
 
2.4 Summary 
Family forms are changing and women are participating on the labour market equally to men. 
Hence, the previous male breadwinner model has become a dual earner society. This has 
resulted in welfare societies creating policies to act on these changes such as through 
providing affordable day care service and benefit schemes for individuals to be able to take 
paid parental leave. Also, regarding the changing family forms, an increased number of single 
parents with a single household income, has created more need for economic support from the 
welfare society. The inequality and poverty in societies also seems to be a growing problem in 
rich countries, however the findings of Salonen (2014) show that family policy reduce the risk 
of poverty within societies. The theoretical framework is a good starting point for the analysis 
part in this study, keeping in mind the dual earner society and thus the parental schemes and 
the need of day care service available when going back to work. Also when analysing the 
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economic support in forms of subsidies and benefits, the inequality and poverty framework on 
the importance of family policy will be highlighted.  
 
3 Definitions 
3.1  Poverty  
There are two definitions of poverty; absolute poverty and relative poverty. Absolute poverty 
refers to individuals lacking the basic necessities to be able to survive and relative poverty 
refers to individual’s living standard being worse than the general living standard in the 
country (EAPN, 2015a). The poverty that most European countries are dealing with is 
generally relative poverty mostly due to the fact that they are all developed countries. To be 
more precise about the concept of relative poverty it is used when referring to individuals that 
are struggling to live a normal life and to participate in normal economic, cultural- and social 
activities (ibid). The benchmark of relative poverty differs between countries as it depends on 
the living standard of the majority. Relative poverty is a serious problem that should always 
be taken seriously, even though it does not sound as serious as the absolute poverty the 
relative poverty is harmful (EAPN. 2015a). Individuals living in poverty do not have the same 
resources as those who do not. They may be dealing with multiple disadvantages due to 
poverty, such as low income, poor housing, lack of health care and more.  
As discussed above, there is not only one specific benchmark of relative poverty that applies 
for all countries however there is only one way to measure it. In the European Union (EU), 
individuals that are measuring below 60 percent of median income are categorized to be at 
risk of poverty (EAPN, 2015b). Within the EU, a poverty line is usually the measurement of 
relative poverty and this line usually ranges from 40-70 percent of the household income. 
Using a poverty line makes it possible to take a general picture of the risk of individuals being 
poor. Additionally this line can be even more thoroughly analysed by looking into age, 
gender, household combination and employment status (EAPN, 2015b).  
As discussed in the theoretical framework of inequality and poverty there is also the concept 
being at risk of poverty which this study will be focusing on. First, it is necessary to explain 
this definition and how it is measured. In the EU the concept is defined as having a disposable 
income of less than 60 percent of the national median (Özdemir & Ward, 2010). The 
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calculations also take on consumption unit weights by the household; 1 unit for first adult, 
0,51 unit for second cohabitating adult, household members above the age of 14 take on 0,5 
unit weight and finally individuals below the age of 14 take on 0,3 in unit weight (Statistics 
Sweden, 2012). Nevertheless, there can always occur temporary situations in decreased 
disposable income such as when taking parental leave or being unemployed resulting in being 
defined at risk of poverty. In such cases it could be enough for some households to be 
classified as below the poverty line, yet knowing if they are at risk of social exclusion is hard 
to determine and in order to be able to do so, a longitudinal survey is needed (ibid). In the 
study of Ólafsson and Kristjánsson (2013) their definitions of being at risk of poverty are 
individuals with 50 percent of the median income. They stress that the proportion of 
individual’s below the relative poverty line has been increasing steadily since 1997 (ibid).  
These definitions are the most common measurements of poverty and they are used to 
evaluate the proportion of the problem. Njáls (2003) states that according to the Luxembourg 
Incomes Study Group, these measurements are also important to measure which groups are 
worst off. In this study, a specific consumer guideline from the Ministry of Welfare will be 
used to compare the cost of living to the income and social benefits provided to fixed groups 
of households with dependent children. By using that specific data, it should reveal if some 
family forms are more likely to be at risk of poverty than other family forms and if all family 
types are getting suitable economic support to sustain suitable Icelandic lifestyle. In this 
study, it is decided to use the EU definition of being at risk of poverty; households with the 
threshold of 60 percent of the national median in disposable income, as it is a well known 
indicator (EAPN, 2015b; Statistical Series, 2014; Özdemir & Ward, 2010). 
 
3.2 Consumer standard 
To be able to answer the research question a clear picture of the living expenses is needed. In 
2010 the Ministry of Welfare established a commission responsible for developing consumer 
standard for all types of Icelandic households (Sturluson et al 2011). To give a brief picture of 
the formation of this commission, the members were appointed by the Welfare minister. The 
committee included researchers, individuals on behalf of the debtor’s ombudsman and the 
Reykjavik city welfare service (ibid). The consumer standard has two guidelines; basic and 
typical. The Ministry of Welfare is obligated to give some guideline regarding a normal basic 
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living expenditure, which is important data to have when deciding social benefits, salary and 
when doing wage contracts (Sturluson et al, 2011).  
The calculation of the consumer standard is only based on real household’s expenses. 
Housing costs are not included as they differ between individuals. Additionally, it does not 
take into consideration the start-up cost of a home (Sturluson et al, 2011). Hence, the real 
expenses are only repairs and renewal of household goods, furniture and electronic devices. 
The consumer standard guidelines are divided into fifteen parts: 1) Food, beverages and other 
convenience goods; 2) clothing and shoes; 3) household goods; 4) electronics and 
maintenance; 5) medication, health care service and medical supply; 6) telephone and 
telecommunications; 7) education and day-care service; 8) refreshments; 9) other service for 
the households; 10) leisure and hobbies; 11) vehicle and public transformations; 12) other 
travelling expenses; 13) rent/calculated rent; 14) maintenance; 15) electricity and heating 
(Sturluson et al, 2011). To put this in relation to this study, an example of typical expenses of 
a couple with two dependent children living in their own housing in Reykjavik is useful. Their 
expenses are 617.610 ISK per month or equal to 4,135 Euros. However, the basic living cost 
for the same family now without the cost of housing and travelling expenses, it is 286,365 
ISK or 1,917 Euros (ibid). 
In this study both guidelines will be used to reflect on the income and economic support from 
the welfare system for all types of households. By using both guidelines it gives the insight 
needed to see if minimum and average income is sufficient, and if the economic support in 
form of benefits is enough in those cases or if the curtail-limit is too severe for one or all 
groups. All costs are in Icelandic currency and therefore for this study it will be recalculated 
into Euros for better international understanding. 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Case study analysis 
“Acknowledging the impossibility of studying society as a whole, the case study 
has been seen as one answer to this question, offering a vantage point from which 
to draw broader conclusions about societal trends and developments.”  
(May, 2011, p. 221) 
Case studies are research strategies that are similar to experiments, however they do not have 
the control variable and therefore it is an intensive method in taking one specific element with 
the intent to generalize across a larger set of units (May, 2011). This study intends to 
investigate the structure of family policy and how the economic support is delivered to 
households with dependent children. Due to the impossibility of studying the whole society, it 
has been decided to create four different family types as experiments. Hence, in this research 
a case study is applied to investigate the problem by examining and comparing these four 
family types. As Scholz and Tietje (2002) argue, a quantitative case study, such as this one, is 
when and if there are numerical units used to represent the major data in the study and also for 
the findings and arguments. 
Case studies have many strengths. One important strength is accuracy and they are also 
particularly helpful when attempting to identify causality in research. George and Bennet 
(2005) point out that in order to identify causality in a case study, questions such as how or 
why are put forth similar to the research questions in this study. Furthermore, they denote four 
strengths of case studies. First George and Bennet (2005) mention the conceptual validity as 
the researcher is able to identify and measure the indicators that are best suited to the 
theoretical concepts. Second, the method can lead to new hypotheses by identifying deviant 
cases. Third, case studies allow for the possibility of exploring the causal mechanisms, finally, 
fourth is their relation to modelling and assessing complex causal relations (ibid). Throughout 
the process of a case study, such as this one, data is gathered for the analysis and that provides 
for content knowledge and understanding of the problem (Ozdilek, 2014). Additional benefits 
are improved analytical skills, independent thinking and relating theory with practice (ibid). 
Despite the many good qualities of case studies as research methods, they also have their 
limitations and downsides. Regarding the validity within a quantitative case study, it is 
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associated to the unit that it intends to measure or assess (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). Yin (2009) 
argues that the lack of organized measures when conducting a case study is the greatest 
concern because of the absence of methodological guidelines. Another issue occasionally 
mentioned in regards to quantitative case studies is the construct of validity, as the 
measurement seems to be objective, but as Berg and Lune argue “quantitative measures 
appear objective, but only so long as we don’t ask questions about where and how the data 
were produced.” (Berg & Lune, 2010, p. 340). 
 
4.2 Research design 
To be able to analyse the economic situation and to be able to see how economic support is 
distributed among Icelandic households with dependent children, four types of families will 
be created. To be sure to capture all main family forms, the family compositions will include 
parents on the labour market with both average wages and minimum wages and two 
dependent children; one in kindergarten and one in primary school. With this in mind, the 
study will capture the lowest income groups as well as the average income groups. Two 
children were selected, rather than one or three as the TFR has remained around 2,0 for a long 
period, and thus, it is most common for Icelandic women to have two children (Statistics 
Iceland, 2014a). Additionally all the family forms will have the same municipal residency for 
accuracy and the chosen one is Reykjavík which is the capital city in Iceland. The population 
of Reykjavík in 2014 is 121,230, which is the most populated municipal in Iceland (Statistics 
Iceland, 2015d).  
It is important to have all the families situated in the same municipal as the cost of living 
differs between municipals. Another reason for all living in Reykjavík is due to the day care 
system, as it differs between municipals. The policy in Reykjavík is to ensure all two-year-old 
children a secure place at kindergartens, which is kept in mind when creating the chosen 
family forms. To make sure the validity holds, it is decided to have all family forms living in 
rented apartments which are the same size and cost the same; three bedroom apartments of 
100m
2
. Registers Iceland has published the average price of rental apartments by size and 
location (Registers Iceland, 2014). For this type of apartment, the average price per m
2
 is 
1,768 ISK or 11,68 Euros. Therefore this apartment will be costing 176,800 ISK a month or 
1,183 Euros. To be cautious of this estimation, the price of the rental apartment is likely 
underestimated, as it is often much higher. 
20 
 
Finally, to mention the situation among the single parents in this study, the child has a legal 
domicile at the household. This is an important remark, as in these calculations, only basic 
alimony is paid to a single parent with full custody of the child. Therefore, the child will not 
be living equally at two homes so the cost will not be equally distributed. This is based on a 
study which found that only 23,3 percent of children with divorced parents have week and 
week living arrangements, while the majority, or 76,7 percent, spend every other weekend or 
less with the parent they do not live with (Guðmundsson & Ómarsdóttir, 2009). These 
findings were supported by another study on living arrangements among children with 
divorced parents as it revealed that only 5,5 percent of teenagers live equally, week and week, 
at both parents (Jóhannsson, 2012). 
Therefore the created family forms used in this study are: 
1. Married/cohabitating couple each with average income and two children; a three year 
old and a ten year old. 
2. Married/cohabitating couple each with minimum wages and two children; a three year 
old and a ten year old. 
3. A single parent with average income and two children; a three year old and a ten year 
old. 
4. A single parent with minimum wages and two children; a three year old and a ten year 
old.  
 
4.3 Data and limitation 
The data used for analysing and comparing the four different family types is mostly 
aggregated macro data from Statistics Iceland and from the Ministry of Welfare. Statistics 
Iceland is a public institution that is a part of the Prime Ministry. The role of the institution is 
to gather data from official records and therefore the reliability of the data should be of high. 
All data used in this study was downloaded from these databases and no adjustments were 
made. 
It is important to consider the limitations of all the definitions and data used in this study. 
Relative poverty has its limitations like all other methods and measurements. One is that the 
cut off point decided in every country can be a rather arbitrary decision (EAPN, 2015b). Also, 
while this way of measurement shows the proportion of poor individuals, it does not show 
how far below the poverty line the people are or for how long they have been poor (ibid).  
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The information on income is from Statistics Iceland and therefore it is reliable data about the 
wages in Iceland. The fact is that mean wages can be quite skewed as individuals with 
extremely high income or very low income can significantly influence the value. For this 
study, it has been decided to use the median income, not the mean income, as the median 
gives a better perspective on the central tendency with equal distribution above and below the 
median value (Statistics for the Terrified, 2015). As for the minimum wages, it is more 
problematic as there are no laws in Iceland on minimum wages, as discussed in the definition 
part (Althingi, 2014). Therefore, the information on minimum wages was gathered from the 
labour unions and should also be reliable. Additionally, the labour in Iceland is quite aware of 
the minimum wages and if they have the slightest belief that they are being paid below that 
amount, they can always go to their trade unions with their pay check and seek justice. 
Therefore, despite the lack of law on minimum wages it is rare that people get underpaid due 
to strong labour unions and law thereof (Althingi, 2015).  
The consumer standard also has its limitations. It is important to keep in mind that the 
consumption pattern can be different between individuals and households. Therefore, it is 
important to have in mind that this is only a guideline and not a fact for all households as 
some spend more while others spend less. Therefore, the consumer standard measurement for 
a typical household is less valid than the basic one as households differ in consumption. The 
basic one however, is high in validity as it shows the minimum cost of living in Iceland 
(Sturluson et al, 2011). 
There is also a limitation due to the fact that spending differs between households and that 
there are many cost factors that I am not able to consider due to the data used for this study. 
Households can have additional costs in student loan payments, consumption loans and 
payments due to leisure activities such as musical lessons. Also the financial participation of 
the alimony payer can differ in amount. Some only pay the amount they are required to by 
law, while others may be fully participating and pay half of all costs related to their child.  
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4.4 Summary 
A quantitative case study such as this one uses numbers to represent the data and the 
arguments and findings are derived from those numbers. Furthermore as George and Bennet 
(2005) argue, a case study can point out a causal relationship by analysing the data. However 
there are always limitations to be considered when conducting research. For example, a 
limitation of this study is the lack of methodological guidelines related to case studies.  
This research is designed to analyse the economic situation among four families with two 
dependent children by their income. Cohabitating couples as well as single parents will be 
analysed, to see if the economic support differs by their marital situation and/or annual 
income. Gathered data is from official institutions such as Statistics Iceland and the Ministry 
of Welfare and thus can be considered as reliable to use for the analysis. 
 
5 Benefits and entitlements  
In this part, all the economic factors within family policy will be explained. First, the child 
benefits will be elucidated with a detailed elaboration due to them being income tested and 
income sensitive. Then the parental leave will get a detailed elaboration in entitled payments 
and the length and share of the parental leave time. Then the day-care system in Reykjavik 
will be introduced, the cost for parents and the variety offered. As this system is not a national 
one, the tariff differs between municipals. Finally, the subsidising of activities for children 
living in Reykjavik will be introduced as it is a part of the family policy, and then there is a 
part where special benefits for single parents are introduced.    
 
5.1 Child benefits 
It was in 1975 that the Icelandic family benefit system was transferred from the social security 
system into the tax system. At that time, the amount of child benefits was 40 percent higher 
for single parents than for couples (Ólafsson, 1999). In 1984, the child benefit system was 
changed and a part of it became income tested (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2006). At first the income 
tested part was 23 percent, however the proportion increased regularly until 1999 when they 
became fully income tested, resulting in a complete deletion of the universal part (ibid). 
Hence, in Iceland the child benefits are used as a tax reduction for parents and as such it is not 
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a universal social security scheme. Those who are entitled to child benefits are individuals 
with unlimited taxability, with dependent children under the age of 18. If in the calendar year, 
the amount of child benefits is higher than the paid taxes of the parents, they will get the 
difference refunded from the Directorate of Internal Revenue (RSK, 2015b). Because the 
child benefits are a tax reduction, it is not paid for the first year of the child, but they are paid 
one year behind and the payments are done quarterly. Furthermore, due to them being 
considered as a tax reduction, the Icelandic child benefits are highly income sensitive both by 
income tax and capital tax. Another fact regarding the amount of the benefits is that it 
decreases when the child grows older. Hence, the amount in entitled benefits is higher for 
children under the age of seven and when the child reaches the age of seven the benefits start 
to decrease and become even more income tested (RSK, 2015b). The motivation for paying 
higher child benefits for younger children is unclear. However, it may be thought of as a 
counteraction to the day care cost of younger children.  
In table 2, below, are the full amounts for couples and single parents both in ISK and also 
calculated in Euros for a more international perspective. For couples, the income reduction of 
the household total income is calculated from yearly wages of a total 4,800,000 ISK or 32,117 
Euros and for single parents 2,400,000 ISK or 16,058 Euros (RSK, 2015b). To put these 
amounts into a better perspective, the yearly wages of the minimum income couple in this 
study is 5,208,000 or 35,632 Euros and the yearly income for the single parent with minimum 
wages it is 2,604,000 or 17,816 Euros. Hence, couples with minimum annual wages and 
single parents with minimum wages, both have income above the threshold of income 
reduction used to calculate the child benefits. 
In table 2, below, the full amount in child benefits is shown without any curtailments of 
income.  For cohabitating couples, the amount is shown for first child and then the addition 
for every child. Same is in the case of single parents, amount of child benefits without being 
curtailed and then additional amount for every additional child. The addition, for children 
under the age of 7, is then showed and the amount is 669 Euros per child regardless of marital 
situation. 
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Table 2 Child benefits for the year 2014 in ISK and Euros 
Child benefits for the year 2014  
  ISK Euros 
   Couples 
  With first child 167,564 1,122 
Every child extra 199,455 1,335 
      
Single parents 
  With first child 279,087 1,869 
Every child extra 286,288 1,917 
      
Addition 
  With child under age 7 100 669,79 
 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015b). 
 
 
The Directorate of Internal Revenue (e. RSK) has published a calculator for individuals so 
they can calculate how much they are entitled to in comparison to their family situation and 
annual income. The reason for this is due to the curtailment limits which are quite complex. 
As explained by the RSK, the amount of child benefits decreases if the income is higher than 
the above mentioned limit by three percent for one child, and if there are two children, it 
decreases by five percent, and in the case of individuals with three children, it decreases by 
seven percent (RSK, 2015b). However, the curtail limit is lower for children under the age of 
seven and is calculated separately, for every child under the age of seven the amount 
decreases by three percent (ibid). The amount of child benefits is updated annually.  
 
  
5.2 Parental leave 
It was in 1981 that the first legislation was enacted on universal rights for parental leave 
(Eydal & Ólafsson, 2006). At first it was a total of three paid months with universal benefits 
of a fixed amount and also a monthly supplement calculated according to the parents working 
hours and their income before the birth of the child (ibid). Additionally, these rights were 
transferable from the mother to the father 30 days after birth. Then, in 1998, legislation was 
enacted that mandated a two week parental leave specifically for the fathers (Eydal & 
Ólafsson, 2006). The parental leave has been developing ever since due to arguments about 
the children’s right to spend time with both their parents and also as a method to increase 
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gender equality on the labour market. There is an independent right for the mothers and the 
fathers to paid parental leave, each with a part that is non-transferable. The Icelandic parental 
leave is a total of nine months that is divided into three months for the mother, three months 
for the father and then there are three months that either the mother or the father can take. The 
most common way is that the mother takes her three months and also the additional three 
months to be able to stay home for the first six months of her newborn child 
(Fæðingarorlofssjóður, 2015b). Before the implementation of these laws that allowed fathers 
to take paid time off work to care for their newborn, the maternity leave consisted of six 
months solely entitled to the mother (Althingi, 1995). 
As for the monthly amount parents are entitled for the year 2014, it is calculated as 80 percent 
of their annual income with a maximum amount of 370,000 ISK or equal to 2,475 Euros per 
month (Fæðingarorlofssjóður, 2015b). The maximum payments have decreased considerably 
since the economic crisis in 2008. Before the crisis, in 2007, the maximum amount was 
considerably higher or 518,000 ISK or equal to 3,544 Euros per month (Fæðingarorlofssjóður, 
2015c). In 2010 it was decreased to 300,000 ISK or equal to 2,036 Euros which is a severe 
reduction from the previous amount in 2007. These drastic cutbacks in payments during 
parental leave are linked to the decline in births and fewer fathers using their right to take 
parental leave (Arnarsson, 2014). Finally, it is important to mention that there are two 
different categories of paid parental leave, one is for individuals on the labour market and the 
other is for students, however as this study is exclusively focusing on households with 
working parents the latter will not be discussed here. 
 
5.3 Day-care service 
The Icelandic day care system is intended for parents with children in need of day-care until 
the start of primary school at the age of six. There are mainly two forms to choose between, 
day-care mothers who run a private business, or kindergartens which can be either private or 
public. However, in Reykjavík, children are not guaranteed a place at kindergartens until they 
reach the age of two, and often they can even be close to three years of age before they 
receive a place. Hence, most parents use the service of day-care mothers until then. The 
public kindergartens are operated by the municipals and the price differs between the 
municipals. As for the privately operated kindergartens they are usually more expensive than 
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the public ones, however they are subsidized by the municipals just as the public ones 
(Reykjavíkurborg, 2015a).  
In Reykjavík the price is calculated by the day-care hours chosen by the parents.  The most 
common amount of day-care hours is eight hours a day and the price is 25,020 ISK or 167,58 
Euros per month for cohabitating couples. There is an additional subsidy for single parents 
due to them only having one income and the price for eight hours for them is considerably 
lower or 15.100 ISK or 101,14 Euros per month (Reykjavíkurborg, 2015a).  
In this study, the analysis is for families with the younger child in kindergarten however 
another system of day-care mothers exists. Day-care mothers are more complex to explain as 
it is a private business thus it will not be described in detail. However, it is important to have 
some description of that part of the day-care system, as children under the age of two are not 
guaranteed a place at kindergarten, and maternity leave in Iceland is only nine month long 
with both the mother’s part and the father’s. Day-care mothers are a private business and as 
such their price list is solely based upon supply and demand and as such there is no official 
tariff. However, the common price for eight hours is around 100,000 ISK which is equal to 
669 Euros per month. The municipals then subsidize this amount for children that are nine 
months old or more in the case of cohabitating couples and the amount is 47,608 ISK or equal 
to 318 Euros per month. In the case of a single parent, it is subsidized for children from the 
age of six months and the amount is 65,184 ISK or 436 Euros (Reykjavíkurborg, 2015a). To 
be cautious in this estimation, the cost before subsidising is likely underestimated, as the price 
is often much higher depending on the supply and demand in the postal codes. 
The reason for briefly mentioning this system is that Reykjavík does not subsidize this cost 
for cohabitating parents until the child has reached the age of nine months. As a result, parents 
that do not have the ability to stay home for longer than the first six months, have to pay the 
full price for three months, which for many can be quite an economic burden. The labour 
market law from 2000 regarding parental leave stresses that the purpose of the law is to 
ensure both parents spend time with their newborn (Althingi, 2000). Therefore, the day care 
regulation in Reykjavík explicitly only subsidizes this service after nine months for 
cohabitating couples (Reykjavik, 2015a). Perhaps this is a method to create an economic 
incentive for both parents to use their rights to parental leave. On the other hand, those who 
have the highest risk of not being able to take longer than six months in parental leave are low 
income households.  
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5.4 Subsidized recreational activities in Reykjavík 
The Department of Sports and Leisure in Reykjavík (ÍTR) has the role to introduce children 
for active participation of sports and leisure as they are known to have preventive values. 
There are many studies that show that children that participate in organized activities are less 
likely to be antisocial and they are less likely to become socially isolated (Posner & Vandell, 
1999). Additionally, studies show that children that are active in leisure and activities adjust 
better in communities, have more friends and also it is known to have a positive influence on 
their self-esteem (Slutzky & Simpkins, 2009). However, due to the fact that many sports and 
leisure activities tend to be expensive, it can be quite an economic burden for many 
households.  
Therefore, due to the known importance of children’s participation in leisure activities and 
that some households with dependent children have had to deny their children of participating 
or having to cut down on that expenditure, the leisure card was established in 2007. The aim 
of the subsidising leisure activities was to increase equality among children despite their 
economic- and social situations. The subsidized leisure card is available for all children from 
the age of six until they reach 18, with legal residency in Reykjavík city. As for the amount, in 
2014, it was 25,000 ISK for the year or 168 Euros (Reykjavíkurborg, 2015b). The grant is 
easy to attain, as there is no need to apply for it and it is allocated online on the digital website 
of Reykjavík and from there it can be disbursed directly to the practice fee. The grant cannot 
be transferred between years, however it can be transferred between semesters. There are 
many activities where this grant can be used, such as football, swimming, gymnasium, 
basketball and more. The majority of all leisure segments participate in the Leisure card, even 
musical schools. The main qualifications for the use of the leisure card is that the activity 
must be pedagogical and that it has taken preventive measures to ensure that the employees 
there are fit to work with children and teenagers (Reykjavíkurborg, 2015b). As for the 
utilisation, it differs by the age of the children. In the age group of 6-12, 95 percent of 
children use the leisure card, in the age group of 13-15 it is 87 percent, and in 16-18 it is 
considerably lower and decreases to 55 percent (Reykjavíkurborg, 2015c).  
The leisure card is a positive support for households with dependent children that choose for 
their children to practice sports or take musical education. The average cost for children to 
play football differs by the age of the child, however to have an example, the cost for a ten 
year old, which each family type in this study has, is 68,000 ISK a year in one of the biggest 
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football clubs in Reykjavik or equal to 456 Euros (KR, 2015). If the child also takes musical 
lesson, that can also be expensive with the school year costing around 99,822 ISK or equal to 
670 Euros (TónskólinnDoReMi, 2015). Therefore, if the children in the composed family 
types for this study both practice football and also take musical lessons it is quite expensive, 
costing the household 167,822 ISK annually or 1,127 Euros. Therefore, the 168 Euros of the 
leisure card can make a difference when it comes to the cost of their children’s leisure 
activities. The debate about the subsidy has however also had a negative side, as there are 
individuals who argue that the cost of leisure activity for children in Reykjavík has increased 
more due to this than it should have without it. Hence, they argue that those who charge take 
advantage of the subsidy and increase the cost for their own benefit. 
 
5.5. Alimony and extra benefits for single parents 
In Iceland, single parents get extra economic support in form of benefit payments that 
cohabitating couples are not entitled to. Even though this support does not make up for not 
having double income, every extra income counts when in need of it. There is an additional 
allowance paid to all single parents or the so called parental allowances. Single parents with 
two dependent children under the age of 18 are entitled to these payments. In some specific 
cases these payments will stop, such as if the parent goes back into cohabitation, gets married 
or moves abroad. For the year 2014 the monthly parental allowance is a total of 7,288 ISK or 
49 Euros (Social Insurance Administration, 2015). Furthermore, the parental allowances are 
not income tested benefits, however it is taxable just as all other income. Hence, the amount 
that the single parent receives monthly depends on their salary and the tax bracket.  
Then there is the economic obligation of the parent that does not live with the child and/or 
share custody. Parents have maintenance obligations to their children until they reach the age 
of 18. They have the obligation to provide housing, clothing and food and even if the parents 
get divorced, they both still have these obligations even though the child mostly lives with 
one parent (Althingi, 2003). There are also alimony payments that this parent pays to the full 
custody parent. However the Local District Commissioner has to confirm the agreement on 
the arrangement of the alimony for it to be valid, and if there is no mutual agreement on the 
monthly amount, it will be taken care of in a single alimony from the Child Support 
Collection Centre (CSCC) (CSCC, 2015). In Iceland, the CSCC is a central institution that 
pays the alimony to the parent with custody, and the alimony payer pays to CSCC, so no 
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direct payments are done between the former couple. This is argued to be more sufficient, and 
all receive alimonies even when alimony payers do not stand up to their commitment. For the 
year 2014 that this study is analysing, a single alimony is 26,081 ISK or equal to 176 Euros 
per month. In special situations, the parent that the child lives with can go to CSCC and get 
extra payments. There is an official tariff that the CSCC uses when extra expenses are needed, 
such as when the child needs to see an orthodontist which is expensive, and also when the 
child has its conformation.   
 
5.6 Summary 
Icelandic child benefits are income-tested and used as a tax reduction. They are highly income 
sensitive and a higher amount is paid for children under the age of seven. Single parents are 
entitled to higher child benefits in comparison to a cohabitating couple. The parental leave is 
three months for the mother, three months for the father and then an additional three months 
they can split between them. The benefit amount for parental leave is calculated as 80 percent 
of their income. The day care service is a responsibility of the municipals and the tariffs differ 
between them. As this study focuses on Reykjavík, the kindergarten tariffs for Reykjavík will 
be used in the analysis part. It is quite common for children to attend recreational activities 
and since 2007 Reykjavik has subsidized these activities by establishing the leisure card to 
assist families with this cost. Single parents receive alimony from the other parent through a 
centralized institution and additionally they are entitled to parental allowances that are extra 
tax reductions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
6  Empirical analysis 
In this part the empirical analysis will be conducted on the aforementioned family types: 
1. Married/cohabitating couple each with average income and two children; a three year 
old and a ten year old. 
2. Married/cohabitating couple each with minimum wages and two children; a three year 
old and a ten year old. 
3. A single parent with average income and two children; a three year old and a ten year 
old. 
4. A single parent with minimum wages and two children; a three year old and a ten year 
old.  
At first the cohabitating couples with both average and minimum income will be analysed to 
see how much they are entitled to in benefits. Next the single parents will be analysed in the 
same way by income and entitled benefits. The final part in this chapter is an analysis on 
poverty and inequality, examining if the benefits have an effect on the four family types and 
their risk of poverty. 
As discussed in the theoretical framework one of the main purposes of a strong family policy 
is to assist individuals in maintaining a basic living standard, hence it serves the citizens as a 
safety net. Here it will be analysed how the economic support of the family policy is delivered 
among Icelandic households by comparing the benefits each family form is entitled to, in 
order to see if the economic support provides a safety net for each of these family types. As 
discussed above, in chapter five, the day care service in Iceland is universal, as all children 
that have reached the age of two are guaranteed a place at a kindergarten, and furthermore the 
cost is subsidized by the municipals. Alternatively as discussed in the method design chapter, 
this study has created four specific family forms to analyse the cost of living and the income 
of their household to see precisely how many benefits they are entitled to and how secure they 
are economically. Regarding the child benefits, it has been explained above that they have a 
curtailment limits that affects some families more than others which is more of a conditional 
welfare system, as Njáls (2003) argued. 
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6.1 Average income couples  
At first, I will begin with the consumption standard for the cost of basic living expenses, 
referring to the minimum that a couple can spend on basic necessities to provide for the 
family. The calculations that are conducted are shown below in table 3, for a cohabitating 
couple with two children, living in Reykjavík, and with the younger child in kindergarten and 
the older in primary school. In Icelandic primary school the hot lunch meals that are offered 
are not for free. Therefore it is common for parents to pay for the hot meals during the lunch 
hours, and as can be seen in table 3, that cost is under the item education and day-care. 
However, the cost of kindergarten is not included there as the hours differ between families 
and therefore it has to be added separately. As discussed above in the chapter of day-care the 
most common day-care hours are eight hours per day which costs 25,020 ISK or 167,58 Euros 
per month for cohabitating couples. The reason for choosing eight hours of day-care for this 
family type is due to both parents being fully employed, and for individuals in full time jobs, 
the eight hours should be sufficient. Additionally, it is needed to add the cost of housing as it 
is not in these calculations due to families have different housing. Some own their apartments 
while others rent. For this study, it was decided that all family forms live in rental apartments 
of 100m
2 
that costs 176,800 ISK a month or 1,183 Euros. With this cost of housing, if the 
family is entitled to housing benefits, it can be calculated as additional monthly income. As 
can be seen below in table 3, the total cost of basic living expenditures for this couple is 1,966 
Euros per month. Including a housing cost of 1,183 Euros, and their kindergarten expenses, 
their total monthly expenses are 3,316 Euros.  
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Table 3 Consumption standard for a couple with two children 
Couple with 2 children 3+10 year old Typical Basic 
 
ISK Euros ISK Euros 
Consumer goods 
    Food, beverages and other convenience 
goods     125,118      840       125,118      840  
Clothing and shoes        32,056      215         23,205      155  
Household equipments        14,311      96           1,431      10  
Electronics and maintenance          8,408      56  
             
841      6  
Total     179,893       1,208        150,595       1,011      
          
Service 
    Medicine, medical supplies and health care         17,480      117         17,480      117  
Phone and telecommunication        21,477      144         17,611      118  
Education and day-care        10,567      72         10,567      72  
Refreshments        29,541      198                 -         0  
Other household services        15,597      105         11,698      79  
Total        94,662      636         57,356      386  
          
Leisure activities 
    Leisure        86,976      584         44,497      299  
          
Expenses without transportation and 
housing     361,531       2,386        252,448       1,654      
     Transportation 
    
Vehicle and public transportation     128,137      861         37,200      
       
250      
Other travelling expenses        14,094      95  
            
Total     503,761       3,419        289,648       1,966      
Reference: Adapted from the Ministry of Welfare (2015). 
The next step is to calculate the child benefits they are entitled to quarterly, with average 
income. However, as this study is performed on monthly basis, the amount they are entitled to 
for the whole year will be distributed over twelve months for better perspective. The detailed 
calculations for the average income couple are shown in table 4 in the appendix.  
As discussed in the chapter of previous research and background the average wage in 2014 
was 454,000 ISK per month or 3,100 Euros. However, as this study is analysing the 
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disposable income and benefits received monthly to meet the cost of living, the income after 
tax is shown in table 5. As can be seen, the average income couple is not entitled to a high 
amounts in benefits, and in total, the child benefits they receive are 47 Euros distributed on 
monthly basis. Below, in table 5, is the total income for average income cohabitating couples 
after tax. Additionally, all entitled benefits and subsidies. The income after tax is 2,183 Euros, 
and due to this household has two adults the amount is double. 
 
Table 5 Total income after tax with all entitled benefits and subsidies 
Couple with 2 children 3+10 year 
old               Average wages 
  ISK Euros 
  
  Housing benefits            0 0 
Child benefits      6,984 47 
Income 1 after tax  320,000 2,183 
Income 2 after tax  320,000 2,183 
      
 Total per month                     646,984      4,413 
 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
 
As discussed above, the total monthly expenses for this couple of average income in basic 
living expenses, housing and kindergarten is 3,316 Euros. At the same time, their monthly 
income after taxes with all benefits is 4,413 Euros. It is important to keep in mind that 
expenses differ between families and there are many other cost factors not in these 
calculations. To mention some examples that are not applicable, consumption loans, student 
loans, insurances and electricity bills were not included in the calculation. Additionally, as 
can be seen in table 4, the curtailment limits for child benefits are quite severe and therefore 
individuals with an average income are not receiving high child benefits quarterly. When it 
comes to child benefits for the average income couple, the strict curtailment limit seems to be 
more in line with liberalism or laissez-faire policies than social democratic ones which is in 
line with the theory of Njáls (2003) and Ólafsson (2011). This strict curtailment for the 
average income household indicates domination of the neo-liberal policy, as Jordan (2006) 
argued on the importance of work, instead of the universal beneficial system of the social 
democratic welfare state of Esping-Anderssen (1990). 
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Now if this same couple would decide to have the third child it would affect their income 
considerably. If the mother would take a paid parental leave of six months, as she is entitled 
to, the amount she gets is 80 percent of her income and due to her average income she will not 
be affected by the maximum limits. Her monthly income would therefore be 363,200 ISK per 
month or equal to 2,478 Euros and take notice that this is before tax or 267,684 ISK after tax 
or equal to 1,826 Euros. For many families, taking a parental leave can be a heavy economic 
burden and individuals with average income are no exemption thereof. Furthermore, the child 
benefits will not increase until the year after the third child is born. Therefore, the income of 
this family of two adults with average incomes, during maternity leave, would decrease to 
4,009 Euros a month, while the expenses for basic living be 3,316 Euros. If both parents 
would take three months together in parental leave, that would decrease their monthly 
disposable income even further, or down to 3,652 Euros a month. If they both take three 
months together they should be able to make ends meet, however there could be difficulties as 
they would need to thoroughly think through each expense, and as explained above, there 
could be expenses that this study does not specify. It seems as though the paid parental leave 
is not an easy economic option for all households and especially not for both parents at the 
same time, indicating that parents of the newborn need to take parental leave at separate times 
to save money and cost on the day-care service. After having analysed the average income 
couple by the basic living standard of the Ministry of Welfare, it seems as it can be a tight 
limit to follow.  
Now analysing the typical consumption standard above in table 3, using the same income, 
housing cost and kindergarten cost for this family type. The total cost per month in the typical 
consumption calculations increases from 3,316 Euros up to 4,769 Euros per month. For this 
couple with the total income and entitled benefits of 4,413 Euros per month (table 5), this 
leaves them with a negative economic status. The only possible way for this household to 
make ends meet is to reduce their expenses from the typical standard down to the basic one. 
This is also true if they choose to have a third child and want to be able to take a paid six 
month parental leave. However, these calculations show that a family of two adults with 
average income and two dependent children are not able to live by the typical consumer 
standard set by the Ministry of Welfare. If an average income couple with two children is not 
able to live by the typical consumption standard, it should be taken seriously. They are 
severely curtailed in paid benefits leaving them solely able to rely on the market. This 
indicates that the safety net of the Icelandic welfare system does not seem to be tailored for 
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the average income household. Furthermore, it raises questions about the low proportion of 
the normal income in payments during parental leave, and if the percentage of monthly 
income should be raised up to a full payment of 100 percent of monthly salary. Hence, a 
family with average income receives low child benefits due to their income and also they face 
a severe decrease in income during parental leave.  
As can be seen in these examples of the average income couples with two dependent children, 
they have severely curtailed child benefits and just manage to make ends meet by the basic 
living cost. Taking paid parental leave is not an economically easy decision, particularly if 
both parents wish to spend time together with the newborn, as they may have to cut spending 
to provide for their family. The economic support in form of benefits is not a universal 
entitlement they can rely on. 
 
6.2 Minimum income couples  
Below is table 6 with the total income of same couple, however, now with minimum wages 
after taxes. As can be seen, they are entitled to housing benefits due to their low income and 
they also receive much higher child benefits yearly. The detailed calculations of the child 
benefits with the curtailment are shown in table 7 in the appendix, there are small curtailments 
due to their income as thoroughly explained in chapter five. However, this cohabitating 
couple of minimum wages receives much higher child benefits compared to the average 
income one. It could be argued that the Icelandic child benefits are mostly aimed at helping 
where it is needed; among lower income households.  
Table 6 Income after tax with all entitled benefits and subsidies 
Couple with 2 children 3+10 year 
old Minimum wages 
  ISK Euros 
   Housing benefits  28,000 188 
Child benefits 2013   44,271 297 
Income 1 after tax  173,694 1,165 
Income 2 after tax  173,694 1,165 
      
 Total per month                     419,659      2,983 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
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Having analysed the income and benefits entitled to the family with minimum wage, it seems 
that Icelandic family policy is aimed towards more vulnerable groups in the society, rather 
than being a universal scheme for all families with dependent children. As can be seen in the 
case of the average income couple, they managed to make ends meet, however they were 
entitled to more limited child benefits in contrast to the minimum wage couple. Therefore, 
now I turn towards analysing if these entitled benefits for the couple of minimum wages are 
sufficient for them to afford the basic essentials of living as shown in table 3 above.  
The total monthly expenses for this couple with minimum wages in basic living expenses is 
shown in table 3, and with the payments of the rental housing and kindergarten, the total 
monthly payments are 3,316 Euros. Above, in table 6, is the monthly income after taxes with 
all benefits entitled, child benefits and housing benefits, with the total amount of 2,983 Euros. 
Just as in the case of the average income families, expenses differ between families and there 
are other cost factors not in these calculations. This shows already, that despite living by the 
basic essential standard of 3,316 Euros their income with entitled benefits of 2,983 Euros is 
not sufficient. Perhaps the child benefits and housing benefits should be considerably higher 
for this family to be able to make ends meet. They receive much higher benefits than the 
average income couple, which is in line with the arguments of Hantrais (2004), who stresses 
that in most countries the public safety net for families aims at supporting those who are 
struggling to provide for themselves. 
If this same couple would decide to have a third child, it would have a worse effect on their 
income than the average income couple. If the mother would take a maternity leave of six 
months with 80 percent of her income, her monthly income would be 168,200 ISK per month 
or equal to 1,130 Euros before tax, and after calculating the tax, equal to 1,022 Euros. This 
strongly indicates that this family with minimum wages has little possibility to take a full 
parental leave of six months, due to the severe decrease of disposable income, leaving them at 
risk of a long term negative economic situation. Despite the economic support in form of 
child benefits and their rights to paid parental leave it is not enough support for a minimum 
wage couple. Perhaps a reform in the benefit system within family policy is needed such as 
through increasing the economic support for cohabitating couples regardless of their income. 
This is a strong sign that taking a parental leave is not an option for all parents. In a previous 
discussion in the theoretical framework, Leira (2006) argued that in the Nordic countries the 
nurturing of children is not solely the mother’s responsibility. Hence, the fathers are seen as a 
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companion parent to the working mothers. However, as discussed in the introduction part 
above, it seems that fewer fathers can afford to use their rights to take parental leave. The fact 
that couples are experiencing financial stress due to the severe decrease in income during 
parental leave is a worrisome development.  
 
6.3 Average income single parents  
Now to analyse the consumption standard for the cost of living, with all expenses, for a single 
parent with two dependent children aged three and ten. Below, in table 8, the calculations are 
based on a family of a single parent living in Reykjavík, where the younger child is in 
kindergarten and the older is in primary school. In table 8, the hot meals during lunch hours is 
also under the item education and day-care. As for the cost of kindergarten, it is not in there 
and will be added separately for eight hours per day. In Reykjavík, single parents get more 
subsidies than cohabitating couples on the kindergarten tariff and therefore pay lower prices 
in day-care service than the cohabitating couples above. For a single parent, the price per 
month is 15,100 ISK or 102 Euros, which is considerably lower than the price for a 
cohabitating couple. Just as in the case of cohabitating parents it is needed to add the cost of 
housing as it is not in these calculations. As previously explained, for this study, it was 
decided that all family forms live in rental apartments of 100m
2 
that costs 176,800 ISK a 
month or 1,183 Euros. 
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Table 8 Consumption standard for a single parent with two children 
Single parent with 2 children 3+10 year 
old Typical   Basic 
 
ISK Euros 
 
ISK Euros 
Consumer goods 
     Food, beverages and other convenience 
goods 88,152  593 
 
88,152 593 
Clothing and shoes 25,538  172 
 
20,263 136 
Household equipments      9,629      65 
 
963 6 
Electronics and maintenance      7,069      48   717 5 
Total 130,388  878  
 
110,095  740  
            
Service 
     Medicine, medical supplies and health care  13,010  87  
 
13,010  87 
Phone and telecommunication 16,213  109  
 
13,294  89 
Education and daycare 8,545        58  
 
8,545  58 
Refreshments 24,378  164  
 
           -      0 
Other household services 10,406  70  
 
7,805  52 
Total 72,552  488    42,654  286 
            
Leisure activities 
     Leisure 63,769  429  
 
34,498  232  
            
Expenses without transportation and 
housing 285,250  1,795  
 
187,247  1,258  
      Transportation 
     Vehicle and public transportation 92,731  624  
 
27,900  188  
Other travelling expenses 8,634  58  
               
Total 368,070 2,476 
 
215,147 1,447 
Reference: Adapted from the Ministry of Welfare (2015). 
As can be seen above in table 8, the total cost of basic living for this family type of a single 
parent with two children is 1,447 Euros per month. When one adds the housing cost of 1,183 
Euros and the kindergarten expenses, their total monthly expenses are 2,732 Euros. With all 
expenses and the cost for a single parent with two dependent children in mind, living with a 
single income is not easy. Thus, it is assumed that the economic support balances this to some 
extent. As for the calculations on the child benefits, they are similar to cohabitating parents, 
however the curtailment limits are different. This can be seen in table 9 in the appendix, the 
average income is calculated in the case of a single parent.  
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For a single parent with average wages of 454,000 ISK per month before taxes or 3,100 
Euros, equal to 2,183 Euros after tax, the benefits are higher than in the case of the couple 
above. The total disposable income with all benefits and alimony received monthly is shown 
in detail in table 10. As can be seen, the total disposable income of the single parent with an 
average income is 2,974 Euros a month.  
 
Table 10 Total income after tax with all entitled benefits and subsidies 
Single parent with 2 children 3+10 
year old Average wages 
  ISK Euros 
   Housing benefits 26,531  178  
Child benefits 2013 36,657  247  
Income after tax  320,000  2,183  
Alimony  50,350  339  
Parental allowances  4,014  27  
      
 Total per month                437,552      2,974 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
As previously discussed the total monthly expenses for a single parent with average income in 
basic living expenses, housing and kindergarten is 2,732 Euros. At the same time, the monthly 
income after taxes with all benefits entitled is 2,974 Euros. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that in the living standard calculations conducted here, it does not have all expenses 
enlisted. There is always the possibility that the single parent also has some consumption 
loans and/or student loans that are needed to be paid monthly, and there is also the electricity 
bill. As can be seen in table 9, the curtailment limits for child benefits are quite severe and 
even a single parent with a single average income is also not receiving full child benefits 
quarterly. A household, with a single parent, two dependent children, and an average income, 
has little possibility to live by the typical consumption standard as it is considerably higher 
than the basic one. With a total disposable income of 2,974 Euros and typical living cost of 
3,763 Euros a month, this is a negative of 789 Euros. These calculations of a single parent 
with average wages show how difficult it is to sustain a basic living standard, and it is not 
even close to providing the income to afford the typical living standard. This raises questions 
about if the entitled benefits and kindergarten subsidies could be more, in order to assist this 
group financially. As discussed in the theoretical framework, Skevik (2006) stresses that this 
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vulnerable group is no longer a small one in the Nordic countries and therefore these changes 
in family forms need more awareness. It seems that despite receiving higher benefits and 
more subsidies than cohabitating couples, providing for dependent children with a single 
income seems to be quite difficult without being extremely resourceful. 
 
6.4 Minimum income single parents  
Now after analysing the situation of a single parent with average income it is interesting to 
probe into the case of a single parent with minimum wages. In table 11 below, the total 
income of a single parent is shown with minimum wages after taxes. As can be seen, the 
housing benefits increase due to the low income, and the same is true for the child benefits. 
The total disposable income with all entitled benefits is 2,243 Euros per month. As for this 
family type, with a housing cost of 1,183 Euros plus the kindergarten cost of 102 Euros, it 
leaves only 958 Euros per month to spend on living expenses and that amount is not sufficient 
either for the basic living cost of the Ministry of Welfare or the typical one shown in table 8 
above. 
 
Table 11 Total income after tax with all entitled benefits and subsidies 
Single parent with 2 children 3+10 
year old Minimum wages 
  ISK Euros 
   Housing benefits 44,500 299 
Child benefits 2013 54,781 368 
Income after tax  179,309 1,207 
Alimony  50,350 339 
Parental allowances  4,386 30 
      
 Total per month                    333,326      2,243 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
The detailed calculations of the child benefits for a single parent with minimum wages is 
shown in table 12 in the appendix. As can be seen, a single minimum income results in the 
closest example of full child benefits in Iceland. It is clear that single parents receive higher 
benefits from the family policy compared to the cohabitating couples. Additionally, the 
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minimum wage single parent receives more than the average income one. These findings are 
in line with the discussion in the background chapter as the scholars Eydal and Ólafsson 
(2003) argue that single parents in Iceland receive almost double in child benefits compared 
to couples. As can be seen in the consumption standard by the Ministry of Welfare it is 
extremely difficult for a single parent with dependent children to provide for themselves. 
Despite being entitled to a higher amount in benefits from the welfare system and not as 
severe curtailments, the group of single parents seems to have harsh living conditions. This is 
in line with the arguments of Skevik (2006) about how the growing group of single mother’s 
challenges the policy makers. Hantrais (2004) stressed that most countries have measures for 
single parents that work as a public safety net. However, this analysis questions if it is 
working as it should in Iceland.  
 
6.5 At risk of poverty 
The analysis of the entitled benefits for the four family types in this study revealed how it 
differs in comparison to their income and how the lowest income groups receive considerably 
more economic support than the average income group. Furthermore, it was clear that it is not 
easy for any of the family types to make their ends meet in comparison to the consumption 
standard from the Ministry of Welfare. Therefore, it is interesting to see how these family 
types are regarded in terms of being at risk of poverty, and if the economic support is working 
as a safety net and reducing this risk. As the findings in the study of Salonen revealed, a 
strong family policy in Sweden reduced poverty threefold (Salonen, 2014). Hence, without it 
poverty would be much higher. Therefore, it is assumed that due to Iceland being known as 
welfare society, the Icelandic family policy should help reducing poverty. However, as 
discussed in the background chapter above, Kruse and Ståhlberg (2013) stress that single 
earning homes are struggling more economically than dual earning households, which is in 
line with the analysis above. Furthermore, they argue that this results in single mothers being 
more at risk of poverty than others. Additionally, Njáls (2003) stresses how low the income 
threshold on social benefits and harsh curtailment limits are in the case of child benefits and 
how that can be related to increased risk of poverty. Hence, single income households are 
known to be more at risk of poverty, as well as households who are only entitled to low 
economic support in the form of child benefits.  
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Statistics Iceland has for the past years collected data on both single parents and cohabitating 
couples with two dependent children, and how great the risk of poverty is for those two 
groups. In figure 3 below, the percentage change from the year 2004 until 2013 is shown for 
these two groups, and how their risk of poverty has developed over time. As can be seen, 
there are dramatic fluctuations in the case of single parents and increased risk of poverty. In 
2005 there was a sharp decrease in poverty among that group, however it increased sharply 
again in 2006. As figure 3 shows, there have been severe fluctuations in the change of being 
at risk of poverty, and since 2012 it has been growing steadily. At the same time, the risk for 
the cohabitating couple has been rather constant since mid 2011. Furthermore as can be seen 
in figure 3, single parents are more at risk of poverty than cohabitating couples. Hence, 
despite being entitled to more economic support in form of benefits, they are more at risk of 
poverty. 
 
Figure 3 Percentage change in risk of poverty 2004-2013 
 
Reference: Adapted from Statistics Iceland (2014b). 
Below in figure 4, the percentage change for households with children and 100 percent work 
intensity is shown in terms of their risk of poverty. The figure shows that this group had 
considerably decreased in size in 2009, however it has started to gradually grow again, which 
is in line with the analysis above where households with dependent children find it 
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troublesome to make ends meet. Both the families of average income and minimum income 
seem to have problems living by the typical consumption standard of the Ministry of Welfare. 
It is assumed that the increased curtailment limits in child benefits could be affecting the 
growing proportion of households with dependent children at risk of poverty, which is in line 
with Njáls (2003) stressing that low child benefits can be related to an increased risk of 
poverty. Hence, despite having a full time job, the households of cohabitating couple with 
dependent children are at risk of poverty. The vicious cycle of income resulting in decreased 
payments in child benefits due to the strict curtailment limits can be a factor. 
 
Figure 4 Percentage change in risk of poverty for households with dependent children 
by work intensity – 100 percent work intensity 
  
Reference: Adapted from Statistics Iceland (2014c). 
 
Furthermore, Statistics Iceland has calculated annually since 2004 the threshold of income 
that a cohabitating couple with two dependent children needs to stay above in monthly 
disposable income to reduce their risk of poverty. Unfortunately, no such data is produced by 
Statistics Iceland for a single parent with dependent children such as this study is analysing. 
However, later in this part calculations will be conducted with the definitions of the EU that 
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was discussed in the definition chapter of inequality and poverty. First, let us examine the 
definition from Statistics Iceland and how it affects our cohabitating couples. 
 
As can be seen below in table 13 this couple needs a monthly disposable income above 2,418 
Euros a month for the year 2013. If they fall below that threshold, they are considered to be at 
risk of poverty. Additionally, in table 13, the calculated threshold of Statistics Iceland is 
shown for every year from 2004 until 2013. The amount for every year establishes how much 
two adults with dependent children need to have in disposable income to not be at risk of 
poverty. Falling below this limit they will become at risk of poverty. 
 
Table 13 Threshold of monthly disposable income – at risk of poverty 2004-2013 
  Amount for two adults and two dependent children 
           
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
           Euros 1,373 1,462 1,578 1,789 1,999 2,279 2,241 2,176 2,215 2,418 
           ISK 203,500 216,700 233,800 265,200 296,300 337,700 332,100 322,500 328,200 358,400 
Reference: Adapted from Statistics Iceland (2014d). 
 
For this part of the study the monthly disposable income in 2013 for the cohabitating couple 
with average wages and two dependent children is shown in table 14 below. As can be seen, 
their disposable income both with and without entitled benefits is above the threshold shown 
in table 13 above. Therefore, that couple is not at risk of poverty, even though they would not 
be entitled to any benefits at all. 
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Table 14 Cohabitating couple with average wages with and without benefits 
Couple with 2 children 3+10 
year old 
Average wages with 
benefits Without benefits 
  ISK Euros ISK Euros 
  
    Housing benefits        0      0 
  Child benefits 2013    6,984     47 
  Income 1 after tax  305,703 2,085 305,703 2,085 
Income 2 after tax  305,703 2,085 305,703 2,085 
          
 Total per month            618,390      4,217 611,406 4,170 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
As for the couple with minimum wages for the year 2013, they have a total monthly 
disposable income of 2,983 Euros, as can be seen in table 15 below. However, with no child 
benefits and no housing benefits they would decrease down to a monthly disposable income 
of 2,336 Euros, which would place them below the threshold, and therefore at risk of poverty. 
Hence, without the economic support from the Icelandic family policy, the monthly 
disposable income of a cohabitating couple with minimum wages would place them at risk of 
poverty. Thus, the family policy helps in reducing their risk of poverty. 
 
Table 15 Cohabitating couple with minimum wages with and without benefits 
Couple with 2 children 3+10 
year old 
Minimum wages with 
benefits Without benefits 
                    ISK      Euros      ISK Euros 
     Housing benefits 28,000 188 
  Child benefits 2013 44,271 297 
  Income 1 after tax  171,238 1,168 171,238 1,168 
Income 2 after tax  171,238 1,168 171,238 1,168 
          
 Total per month                   414,747      2,983 342,476 2,336 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
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The average income couple has a considerably higher monthly disposable income; however 
they received much lower child benefits. As can be seen above in table 14, the couple with 
average income has 4,217 Euros per month which is considerably higher than the benchmark 
shown in table 13. Without their child benefits they would only be 47 Euros closer to this 
benchmark, which is still much higher than the threshold.  
In the case of the cohabitating couple with minimum wages, the economic support of the 
family policy keeps them above the benchmark of being at risk of poverty. Even though this 
study has no detailed information on how many are defined as a couple with minimum wages, 
it is possible to draw conclusions from this analysis as the data used is from Statistics Iceland 
and information on minimum wages for the year 2013. Therefore, without this economic 
support from the family policy, they would fall below that benchmark. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the group at risk of poverty would be considerably bigger without the family 
policy. Families with average income or higher are therefore less likely to be at risk of 
poverty. Hence, it makes little difference whether they receive these benefits or not in relation 
to their risk of poverty. 
The calculations of being at risk of poverty by the EU definition is a disposable income with 
60 percent of the national median, with consumption unit weights, or in the case of 
cohabitating couple with two dependent children under the age of 14; 371,925 ISK or 2,526 
Euros a month. And compared to this definition the average income couple in table 14 is 
above that threshold with all entitled benefits and also without them. As for the minimum 
wages couple, described in table 15, they are above with all entitled benefits but without the 
entitled benefits they fall below, placing them at risk of poverty.  
Despite not having data from Statistics Iceland with a threshold of monthly disposable income 
for a single parent with dependent children at risk of poverty, the EU measurement will be 
sufficient. It can be seen above in figure 3, that at they are at more risk of poverty than double 
income households. This is in line with the analysis of sustaining a basic living expenses with 
a single income, and despite the economic support of the family policy it is still not sufficient. 
A single income, plus the benefits, is not enough for all households. Again the EU calculation 
is 60 percent of the national median in disposable income with same consumption unit 
weights, however now with only one adult which is 359,046 ISK or 2,439 Euros a month.  
Table 16, below, shows that a single parent with minimum wage is under the EU threshold, 
relating to being at risk of poverty, with a disposable income of 2,204 Euros a month, and 
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without all entitled benefits falls even lower with 1,507 Euros a month. Therefore, this single 
parent would be at risk of poverty both with and without the family policy that often is 
referred to as aiding the lowest income groups. 
 
Table 16 Single parent with minimum wages with and without benefits 
Single parent with 2 children 3+10 
year old Minimum wages Without benefits 
  ISK Euros ISK Euros 
     Housing benefits 44,500 299 
  Child benefits 2013 54,781 368 
  Income after tax       171,238 1,168 171,238 1,168 
Alimony  50,350 339   50,350    339 
Parental allowances    4,386 30 
            
 Total per month       325,255      2,204 221,588 1,507 
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
However as can be seen below in table 17, the single parent with an average income and all 
entitled benefits is above the threshold at risk of poverty of 2,439 Euros a month. When not 
entitled to the economic support of the family policy in form of benefits, this individual falls 
below the threshold thus making him at risk of poverty. Hence, here the family policy helps 
reducing the risk of poverty. 
 
Table 17 Single parent with average wages with and without benefits 
Single parent with 2 children 3+10 
year old         Average wages Without benefits 
  ISK Euros ISK Euros 
     Housing benefits 26,531  178  
  Child benefits 2013 36,657  247  
  Income after tax  305,703  2,085  305,703  2,085  
Alimony  50,350  339  50,350  339  
Parental allowances  4,014  27  
            
 Total per month       423,255      2,876 356,053  2,424  
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015). 
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A cohabitating couple with average income and two dependent children is above the EU 
calculated threshold of being at risk of poverty both with and without all entitled benefits. As 
for the case of cohabitating couple with minimum wages and two dependent children, they are 
above this threshold when receiving all benefits. However, if they would not receive any child 
benefits they would fall below the threshold and thus become at risk of poverty. Hence, in the 
case of average wage couple they are always above the threshold of being at risk of poverty. 
As a result of the family policy aiding the lowest income groups, the minimum wage couple 
are above the threshold with all entitled benefits – without it they would be at risk of poverty. 
Single parents with minimum wages and two dependent children are at risk of poverty with 
and without the family policy. It does not matter if they are entitled to benefits or not, they are 
always below the threshold defined by the EU. However, a single parent with an average 
income and all entitled benefits is above this threshold, but when the benefits are not taken 
into calculations of the disposable income of the single parent, they are below the EU 
threshold and therefore at risk of poverty. 
 
7 Conclusions 
The Icelandic family policy seems to lack a certain universalism in child benefits and the 
curtailment limits seem to be too severe. One can evaluate this situation in calculations about 
the spirit of social unity. In this respect, referring back to scholars, they argue that when the 
structure of family policy is in supporting tax credits as supplements, it is a sign of liberal 
influences (Eydal & Ólafsson, 2006; Ólafsson, 2011; Jordan, 2006; Njáls, 2003). The 
Icelandic family policy seems to be a safety net primarily designed to aid the lower income 
individuals and more vulnerable households. However, it is questionable, in the case of single 
parents, if they are receiving enough economic support and if they are even in need of extra 
resources. There are signs that a reform in the family policy is needed to increase the 
economic support, not only to the most vulnerable groups but also for the average income 
households who seem to struggle living by the consumer standard. Another angle to this 
problem could be that Icelandic wages are too low, as they do not suffice in many cases for 
sustaining an acceptable living standard. Below I will summarise the findings of this study 
and restate the answers to the research questions.  
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How are Icelandic family policy benefits and payments delivered along family forms? 
It is clear that the economic support is more directed towards those who are most in need of it, 
hence the single parents. The family policy is systematically aiding the most vulnerable 
family forms, as in the case of child benefits. In the case of minimum wage couple, they 
receive higher child benefits than the same family form of a couple with average income. As 
for the structure of the parental leave, it seems as if the low maximum payments are affecting 
who can afford to make use of that option. As could be seen in the data from the Icelandic 
parental leave benefit fund (Fæðingarorlofssjóður), fewer fathers are taking parental leave and 
the number of births is decreasing. This indicates that the effects of the severe reduction in 
payments since the economic crisis in 2008 are emerging. The risk is that those who are least 
able to afford to use their rights of parental leave are the lower income individuals. By 
reducing their income 20 percent, they could risk their whole household economy for the long 
term. Furthermore, the fact that kindergarten in Reykjavík is not able to ensure children a 
place until they are at least two years old results in parents having to pay a high cost for the 
service of a day care mother. The risk is that there is too large a gap for many households 
between the paid parental leave and subsidized child care that is affordable. Increasing the 
proportion of the monthly payments of income from 80 percent to 100 percent could be a 
starting point. However, there is also the question of if it is necessary to extend the time 
period from six months to nine months for mothers as they are the ones who are more likely 
to fully utilize their rights to parental leave. The Icelandic parental leave is relatively short, 
especially with the age of the child and the availability of a secure place in day-care service in 
mind. The risk is that parental leave will only be affordable for selected individuals, which is 
not an inspiring vision.  
How is the economic support of the Icelandic family policy outlined in terms of benefits and 
entitlements? Does it help in reducing the risk of inequality and/or poverty? 
Without the economic support of the family policy more individuals with dependent children 
would be at risk of falling below the threshold of being at risk of poverty. Hence, it is clear 
that the economic support helps in reducing the risk of poverty. In the case of cohabitating 
couples with minimum income, the family policy prevents them from falling below the 
threshold of being at risk of poverty. The same situation is apparent among single parents 
with average wages. They are above this threshold with all entitled benefits, however without 
the benefits, they fall below the threshold. The average wage couples are always above this 
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calculated threshold, and despite receiving low benefits, it does not make any difference, they 
are not at risk of being poor. However, there is a more worrisome situation among the group 
of single parents with minimum wages in Iceland; they are at risk of poverty with and without 
this economic support. This indicates that a reform is needed to add extra support for this 
vulnerable group. As in the case of minimum wage families, they are struggling to make ends 
meet and they are not receiving enough in child benefits or subsidies to prevent them from 
long term economic difficulties.  
Finally, in this thesis I have analysed the economic support of the family policy to see how 
effective it is in reducing poverty and inequality within the Icelandic society. Though the 
economic support seems to protect single parents more, a worrisome and critical situation 
exists among single parents with minimum income, which calls for drastic measures. 
Additionally, in the case of single parents with both average and minimum incomes, they 
seem to have trouble living in accordance with an acceptable living standard. Having to 
consider all spending for long term can become nerve-racking. And last but not least, the 
structure of the parental leave seems to have too low maximum payments, and it is quite 
short. The severe decrease in fathers using their rights to take parental leave and the decrease 
in the number of births is not a positive future development.  
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Appendix 
Table 4 Calculations of child benefits for a couple with average income 
Child Benefits 2014  on account of income 2013, paid for children born 1996-2013 
        Marital situation: Cohabitating 
couple 
    Number of children: 2, thereof one under the age of 7 
  
     
ISK Euros 
 Income 2013 
   
10,464,000 70,275 
 Curtailment 
limits 
   
4,800,000 32,236 
 Foundation for 
curtailment 
  
5,664,000 38,039 
 
        General child benefits 
  
367,019 2,465 
 Curtailment due to 
income (5%) 
  
283,200 1,902 
 
        Addition due to children under the 
age of 7 100,000 672 
 Curtailment due to income (3%) 
 
100,000 672 
                 
Total amount of child 
benefits 
  
83,819 563 
 Child benefits equally distributet 
between the couple 41,910 281 
 Quarterly 
payments 
   
10,478 70 
  
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015) 
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Table 7 Calculations of child benefits for a couple with minimum income 
Child Benefits 2014  on account of income 2013, paid for children born 1996-2013 
        
        Marital situation: Cohabitating couple 
    Number of children: 2, thereof one under the age of 7 
  
     
ISK Euros 
 Income source 
2013 
   
4,896,000 32,281 
 Curtailment limits 
   
4,800,000 32,236 
 Foundation for curtailment 
  
96,000 655 
 
        General child benefits 
  
367,019 2,465 
 Curtailment due to income 
(5%) 
  
4,800 32 
 
        Addition due to children under the age of 
7 100,000 672 
 Curtailment due to income (3%) 
 
2,880 19 
                 
Total amount of child 
benefits 
  
459,339 3,085 
 Child benefits equally distributet 
between the couple 229,670 1,542 
 Quarterly 
payments 
   
57,418 388 
  
Reference: Adapted from the Ministry of Welfare (2015) 
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Table 9 Calculations of child benefits for a single parent with average income 
Child Benefits 2014  on account of income 2013, paid for children born 1996-2013 
        
        Marital situation: Single 
parent 
    Number of children: 2, thereof one under the age of 7 
  
     
                                      ISK                            Euros 
 Income source 
2013 
   
5,232,000 35,185 
 Curtailment 
limits 
   
2,400,000 16,140 
 Foundation for 
curtailment 
  
2,832,000 19,000 
 
        General child benefits 
  
565,375 3,802 
 Curtailment due to 
income (5%) 
  
141,600 952 
 
        Addition due to children under 
the age of 7 100,000 672 
 Curtailment due to income 
(3%) 
 
84,960 571 
                 
Total amount of child 
benefits 
  
438,815 2,951 
 Quarterly 
payments 
   
109,704 737 
  
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015) 
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Table 12 Calculations of child benefits for a single parent with minimum wage  
Child Benefits 2014  on account of income 2013, paid for children born 1996-2013 
        
        Marital situation: Single parent 
    Number of children: 2, thereof one under the age of 7 
  
     
                           ISK                        Euros 
 Income source 
2013 
   
2,448,000 16,463 
 Curtailment limits 
   
2,400,000 16,140 
 Foundation for 
curtailment 
  
48,000 328 
 
        General child benefits 
  
565,375 3,802 
 Curtailment due to income 
(5%) 
  
2,400 16 
 
        Addition due to children under the 
age of 7 100,000 672 
 Curtailment due to income (3%) 
 
1,440 9,68 
                 
Total amount of child 
benefits 
  
661,535 4,449 
 Quarterly 
payments 
   
165,384 1,112 
  
Reference: Adapted from RSK (2015) 
 
